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I. INTRODUCTION

When Darlene Emanski subscribed to America Online (AOL), she
thought she was providing her teenage daughter with a fun and convenient
means of researching school projects, communicating with friends, and
listening to music now and then.' The Central Florida small business
owner never imagined that she also might be enabling her daughter to
become a digital music pirate.' Last year, AOL notified Emanski that the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)3 had issued a
subpoena to learn her identity, taking the first step toward suing her for
copyright infringement.' Emanski was shocked.5 Although she knew that
her then fifteen-year-old daughter had downloaded some music, Emanski
said she had no idea that in a matter of weeks the teen had amassed a
library of more than seven hundred songs on the computer hard drive. 6
And, even though Emanski kept up to date with current affairs, she said

1. See telephone interview with Darlene Emanski (Nov. 14,2004) (on file with author); see
also Woman Facing $45 7K in Finesfor Daughter'sIllegal Downloading, WFTV.coM, Oct. 6,
2004, http://www.wftv.com/news/378891 l/detail.html.
2. See telephone interview with Darlene Emanski, supra note 1.
3. The RIAA is a trade association that represents major recording companies, including
BMG Entertainment, Sony Music, and Virgin Records. See Recording Industry Association of
America, About Us, http://www.riaa.com/about/default.asp (last visited July 9, 2005); Recording
Industry Association of America, About Us: Distributed Labels of Reporting Companies,
http://www.riaa.com/about/members/default.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
4. See telephone interview with Darlene Emanski, supra note 1. Section 512(h) of the
Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), which has been incorporated into the 1976 Copyright
Act, grants copyright owners the right to request the clerk of any federal district court to issue a
subpoena to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to identify an alleged infringer. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(h) (2005). For a discussion of the subpoena authority, see Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive:
Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer?,26 COLuM. J.L. & ARTS 371,392-96 (2003).
5. See telephone interview with Darlene Emanski, supra note 1.
6. See id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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she did not realize that her daughter was violating copyright law or that
she could be held legally accountable for her daughter's conduct.7
Since receiving the notification from AOL, Emanski has taken steps to
reduce her chances of eventually being sued by the RJAA.8 She has
informed herself about the restrictions against the unauthorized sharing of
copyrighted music and has forbidden her daughter from further engaging
in the practice. 9 Although the teenager initially was amused by the hubbub
caused by her downloading, she has come to appreciate the gravity of the
situation.1" She has obeyed her mother's new rule and has returned to
buying compact discs (CDs) to quench her thirst for new music."1
The RIAA's lawsuits against individuals served as a wakeup call not
only to Emanski, but also to parents throughout the United States.' 2 Since
September 2003, the RIAA has filed suit against at least 11,809
individuals for allegedly trading music online. 3 Many of these persons are

7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id
12. See Jefferson Graham, Recording Industry Sues Parents; Who is Responsiblefor Kids'
Downloads?,USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2003, at D4; see also Frank Ahrens, RIAA's Lawsuits Meet
Surprised Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y Among Defendants, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at E 1; Steve Knopper, 261 Music FansSued, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 16,2003,
at 25.
13. See Recording Industry Association of America, Press Room: News & Views,
http://www.riaa.com/news/ (last visited July 9, 2005) (collecting press releases issued after each
new round of lawsuits were filed). Each round contained the following number of lawsuits (the date
of the RJAA press release is in parenthesis): 754 (Aug. 31, 2005); 765 (July 28, 2005); 784 (June
29, 2005); 91 (May 26, 2005); 725 (Apr. 27, 2005); 405 (Apr. 12, 2005); 753 (Feb. 28, 2005); 717
(Jan. 24, 2005); 754 (Dec. 16, 2004); 750 (Oct. 28, 2004); 762 (Sept. 30, 2004); 744 (Aug. 25,
2004); 506 (July 20, 2004); 482 (June 22, 2004); 493 (May 24, 2004); 477 (Apr. 28, 2004); 532
(Mar. 23, 2004); 531 (Feb. 17, 2004); 532 (Jan. 21,2004); 41 (Dec. 3, 2003); 261 (Sept. 8, 2003).
Id. These lawsuits total 11,809.
The RIAA initiated its policy of suing individuals after the decision of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California in Metro-Goldwyn-MayerStudios, Inc. v. Grokster,Ltd., 259
F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated by 125 S. Ct.
2764, remanded to 2005WL1940358 (9th Cir. 2005). In Grokster, movie and record industry
plaintiffs sued peer-to-peer (P2P), file-sharing services, Grokster, Ltd. and Streamcast Networks,
Inc., for copyright infringement under the theories of vicarious liability and contributory
infringement. Grokster,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32. The district court held the defendants were not
liable under either theory. Id. at 1042-43, 1045-46. The court reasoned that the defendants, unlike
Napster, had a decentralized system that did not require their users to go through their Internet
servers for the purpose of searching and connecting with other users. Id. at 1039-40.
In response to the district court's decision, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) introduced the Inducing
Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, commonly referred to as the Induce Act. See S. 2560,
108th Cong. (2004). The bill, which died in committee, sought to create a new standard of
the existing2005
derivative liability doctrines. See id.; Thomas,
without
modifying
copyrightby
liability
Published
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the parents of pre-teen and teenage Internet users.' 4 In the wake of this
innovative anti-piracy campaign, scores of parents have found it necessary
to expand the scope of their parent-child discussions. 5 In addition to
talking about sex, smoking, and substance abuse, many parents now also
discuss the perils of file sharing.' 6 Consequently, parents have had to
examine their own views about the recording industry,17 intellectual
property rights, and the interplay between law and morality.
It is important to note that the RIAA did not specifically target
parents. 8 When the trade association filed its lawsuits, it did not have any

Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress, S. 2560 (2004), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?c108:1 :./temp/-clo8em8m7d:: (noting the status of the bill). The bill would have
made clear that anyone who "intentionally induce[d]" copyright infringement would be liable as
an infringer. See S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). It defined "intentionally induces" as "intentionally
aids, abets, induces, or procures." S. 2560 § (g)(1). Since the bill focused on the defendant's
intentions and conduct, rather than on the type of technology it used, it would have enabled courts
to find P2P networks liable for copyright infringement. See The Intentional Inducement of
Copyright Infringements Act of 2004, Hearing on H.R. 2560 Before the S. Committee on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of the Honorable Marybeth Peters).
The Supreme Court's recent ruling in Grokster may accomplish what Sen. Hatch sought to
achieve through the failed Induce Act, however. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). The Court stated that a person who distributes a product with the
intent of enabling others to infringe copyright and who through words or actions shows an intent
to cause and profit from such infringement is liable for the infringement. See id. at 2782. The Court
found that the defendants could therefore be held liable for their users' infringement. See id. at
2782-83. The Court noted that there was ample evidence of the defendants' unlawful purpose. See
id. at 2781-82.
The RIAA is likely to continue to sue individuals even if P2P networks are now exposed to
contributory infringement liability as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster.Some
P2P networks would likely continue to operate. Furthermore, the RIAA would likely regard its
lawsuits against individuals as a deterrent against unauthorized file sharing.
14. See Graham, supra note 12, at D4. The RIAA said it did not know how many of the
defendants in the first round of lawsuits were children and how many were parents. See Associated
Press, Suing Parentsfor CopyrightInfringement Could Be Difficult, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2003,
availableathttp://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-09-12-parents-riaa-oddsx.htm.
15. See Amy Harmon, New Parent-to-ChildChat: Do You Download Music?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2003, at Al (reporting that the RIAA's lawsuits prompted parents to discuss file sharing
with their children).
16. See Benny Evangelista, ParentsStart To Rein in Kids Downloading Music; Recording
Industry Suits Puta Crimp in Another Teen Pastime,S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2003, at E l (reporting
that after learning of the RIAA's lawsuits one mother wrote in an e-mail: "'I resent the fact that
now parents have to add another dimension to 'The Big Talk' (about sex, drugs, alcohol, AIDS,
peer pressure) and include a caution about music downloading and how it may financially devastate
the family."').
17. See Jennifer Howland, Cyber-ethics Throw Wrench in Mom's World View, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (Boston, MA), Nov. 17, 2003, at Opinion 9 (mother of two teenage daughters
expressing her views on the record industry and the ethics of downloading music).
18. In fact, it appears from the RIAA's sample complaint for copyright infringement that the
association only alleged counts of direct infringement-that the defendants had violated the 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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personal information on the individual defendants. 9 It merely had the
name or Internet Protocol (IP) address of the persons who had subscribed
to the Internet Service Providers (ISPs).2 ° The fact that many parents have
been snagged in the litigation has not caused the RIAA to retreat from its
policy of suing individuals, though. The organization has stated that in
today's world, parents need to be aware of their children's online
activities.2 '
Since the RIAA has been willing to settle most lawsuits for several
thousand dollars or less,22 most parents have concluded that it is in their

copyright owners' exclusive right to distribute and copy the copyrighted works. See Recording
Industry Association of America, Sample Complaint for Copyright Infringement,
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/sampleComplaint.pdf (last visited May 18, 2005)
[hereinafter RIAA, Sample Complaint]. The sample complaint did not include an alternative count
of contributory infringement or vicarious liability. See id.If the RIAA proceeded in its lawsuit
against a parent who had not engaged in unauthorized file sharing, it would probably have to amend
its complaint to allege contributory infringement or vicarious liability. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a) would allow the RIAA to amend its complaint "by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party." See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The rule provides that "leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires." Id.
19. See Recording Industry Association of America, Frequently Asked Questions About the
Recording Industry's Use of"John Doe Lawsuits," http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/012104_
faq.asp (last visited May 18, 2005) [hereinafter RIAA, "John Doe" Lawsuits].
20. See id. In September 2003, the RIAA first issued subpoenas to the ISPs to learn the
identities of the alleged infringers, and then filed lawsuits against those individuals. See id. Most
ISPs cooperated with the subpoenas but a couple, including Verizon Internet Services, challenged
the subpoenas on statutory and constitutional grounds. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v.
Verizon, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In December 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit held that under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, a plaintiff could only issue a
subpoena to an ISP storing infringing materials on its servers and not to an ISP that merely allowed
files to be transferred between two Internet users. Id. at 1236-37. The RIAA changed its litigation
procedure following that ruling. See RIAA, "John Doe" Lawsuits, supra note 19. The association
now files "John Doe" lawsuits, using the alleged infringers' IP addresses as placeholders for the
individuals' names, and then issues the subpoenas to the ISPs. See id. The effect of the D.C.
Circuit's decision has therefore been to make the process slightly more complicated. See Alice Kao,
Note, RIAA v. Verizon: Applying the SubpoenaProvision of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
405,426 (2004); see also Samantha Chang, Verizon Ruling Misses Forestfor Trees, Industry Says,
BILLBoARD, Jan. 10, 2004 (discussing the reaction to the Verizon decision).
21. RLAA Chairman Mitch Bainwol, in commenting on the RIAA lawsuit filed against a 12year-old New York girl, said, "We're trying to send a strong message that you are not anonymous
when you participate in peer-to-peer file sharing and that the illegal distribution of copyrighted
music has consequences. And as this case illustrates, parents need to be aware of what their
children are doing on their computers." Ahrens, supra note 12, at El.
22. See John Accola, Settlingfor (More Than) a Song; Some Downloaders Pay Up, To the
Tune of$1,000-$4,000, ROCKY MOUNTAINNEWS (Denver, Co.), Oct. 23, 2003, at lB. For a sample
pre-litigation settlement agreement, see http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/sampleAgree
ment.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). During the first rounds of lawsuits, the RJAA sent a prelawsuit notification letter and offered persons a chance to settle before filing a lawsuit. See RIAA,
"John Doe"
supra note 19.Repository,
The association
Published
by Lawsuits,
UF Law Scholarship
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best interest to stay out of court. A parent who chooses to contest the
24
action would be forced to spend thousands of dollars defending himself.
And if ultimately found liable, the parent could be forced to pay statutory
damages ranging from $750 to $150,000 for each song his child illegally
reproduced.
Given parents' overwhelming incentive to settle, it is not surprising that
as of the time this Note was written, there were no published legal
decisions involving parents who have been sued as a result of their
children's file sharing. 26 Apparently, no court has yet had the opportunity
to consider whether and under what circumstances a parent could be held
liable for the infringing conduct. The purpose of this Note is to examine
this novel, unexplored question, thereby enabling courts, legislators,
attorneys, families, and the record industry to better understand the legal
and policy issues involved and to make informed decisions when
confronted with this matter.27

the infringer's name and address. See id.
23. See Accola, supra note 22, at lB. The statement of Erik Fischer, a Fort Collins, Co.
attorney representing a defendant father, exemplifies this sentiment. See id "You couldn't do two
depositions and order copies for what we are going to settle for," Fischer said. Id. "We've talked
about viable defenses, but it's hard to do anything but settle when the (record companies) are
willing to settle for a lot less than it would cost to defend a client." Id.
24. See id.
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2005). A plaintiff may seek either actual or statutory damages.
See id. Since individuals do not typically make a profit from the infringement, the RIAA has sought
statutory damages. See RIAA, Sample Complaint, supra note 18. Statutory damages range from
$750 to $30,000 per work, with a possible increase to $150,000 for each infringed work in cases
of willful infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2005). The RIAA has said that it would leave it
up to the court what damages to award. See RJAA, "John Doe" Lawsuits, supra note 19.
26. On March 27,2005, the author conducted the following broad search on Westlaw in the
"All Federal Cases" database with a date restriction of the most recent ten years: "parent & 'file
sharing' & infringement." The search failed to yield any results for a copyright infringement case
against a parent.
27. While there is a dearth of scholarly legal analysis on parents' potential liability for the
unauthorized file sharing of their children, attorneys, professors, and other interested parties have
briefly commented on the subject in news articles. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 12, at D4
(reporting one law professor's view that proving the knowledge element of contributory
infringement would be difficult); Robert Jacques, Parents Liable for Kids' P2P Downloads,
VNUNET.COM, (Aug. 8, 2003), http://www.vnunet.com/news/l 142890 (reporting that some
attorneys believe that parents could be held responsible if they know or should know that their child
is sharing MP3 files and if they permit the conduct). Scholarly legal analysis has generally focused
on the liability of corporations for file sharing of their employees, ISPs for the conduct of their
subscribers, and bulletin boards and file-sharing services for the conduct of their users. See
generally Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2002)
(discussing ISP liability); Mary M. Luria & Gary A. Kibel, CorporateLiabilityfor Online File
Sharing, 11 METROPOLITAN CORP. CouNs. 4 (2003) (discussing vicarious liability of employers);
Benjamin A. Glatstein, Comment, Tertiary Copyright Liability, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1605 (2004)
(analyzing liability of party who assists indirect infringers); Andrea Sloan Pink, Comment,
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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Throughout this Note, the term "child" will refer to a minor child, and
the term "parent" will refer to a parent or legal guardian. Part II suggests
that a parent typically would not be held liable under the copyright
doctrine of vicarious liability. It surmises that a parent could be held
responsible under the related doctrine of contributory infringement, but it
notes significant differences between parents and the defendants that have
been found culpable in prevailing cases. In an attempt to resolve the
uncertainty surrounding this issue, this author looks to a related area of
law, torts, for guidance. Part 1l1 asserts that imposing parental liability in
the copyright context would be consistent with common law precedent.
Part IV shifts to a public policy discussion, pointing out the reasons it
would be just to hold parents accountable for their children's file sharing.
Part V contends that contributory infringement could serve as ajust theory
of parental liability if applied in a manner that comports with key
principles of common law and statutory tort law. This Note concludes with
a broad recommendation that parents actively monitor their children's
Internet use, and thereby fulfill one of their important, new responsibilities
in the digital age.
II. PARENTS' LIABILITY FOR THEIR CHILDREN'S FILE SHARING

A parent is not liable for his child's copyright infringement solely
because of the parent-child relationship.2 8 A child is a separate legal

individual liable for his own copyright infringement in the same manner
and to the same extent as an adult.29 This rule became widely apparent in
September 2003 after the RIAA sued a 12-year-old New York girl for

Copyright Infringement Post Isoquantic Shift: Should Bulletin BoardServices Be Liable?, 43
UCLA L. REv. 587, 621 (1995) (commenting on indirect infringement). For an interesting
discussion of derivative liability from an economic perspective, see Douglas Lichtman & William
Landes, Indirect Liabilityfor CopyrightInfringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 395 (2003).
28. This was also the case under common law tort principles. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 123 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984); see also 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent
and Child § 96 (2005); 45 AM. JUR. 2D Proofof Facts 549, at § 1 (2005). This legal division
between parent and child was based on the notion that individuals of all ages should take
responsibility for their willful, wrongful actions, and that liability should not be imposed without
fault. See Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, LiabilityforDamageCausedby Minors:A ComparativeStudy,
5 ALA. L. REv. 1, 6, 31 (1952) (noting that the common law viewed the family as a "group of
responsible individuals, child and adult alike").
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (stating that the capacity of an individual to be sued shall be
determined by the law of the individual's domicile). The general rule among the states is that an
infant is liable for his own torts, as long as the tort does not arise out of or is not related to a
contract. See 42 AM. JuR. 2D Infants § 127 (2005); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 17(c) (providing that
an infant's representative may defend on behalf of the infant).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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downloading30the music of Mariah Carey and Christina Aguilera, among
other artists.

Notwithstanding a child's capacity to be sued, a parent theoretically
could be held responsible for his child's file sharing under the principle of
derivative liability. 31 Copyright law has long acknowledged that one
person can be held liable for the infringement of another under certain
circumstances. 32 At the time the 1976 Copyright Act was adopted, the Act
did not expressly recognize derivative liability. 33 Section 106 of the Act3 4
provides support for the concept, though. That section states that a
copyright owner has the exclusive right "to authorize" others to exploit
any of the six rights enumerated in the section,35 such as the right to
30. See Lorena Mongelli, Music Pirate:N.Y Girl, 12, Suedfor Web Songs Theft, N.Y. POST,
Sept. 9, 2003, at Sport & Late City Final 1; Soni Sangha & Phyllis Furman, 12-Year-Old Honor
Student Among ThoseHit With Music-SharingSuit, DAILYNEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 9,2003, at Domestic
News. The RIAA quickly settled the lawsuit for $2,000. See Kyle Stock, Charleston,S.C., Parents
Opt Out of File-Servers to Dodge Download Liability, POST AND COURIER, Sept. 23, 2003.
31. For a thorough discussion of the concept of derivative liability, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 4
COPYRIGHT § 6:1-6:23 (2d ed. 2002).

32. See SHELDON W. HALPERN, COPYRIGHT LAW: PROTECTION OF ORIGINAL EXPRESSION
551 (2002).
33. See MELVILLE B. N1MMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A]
(2004). Later, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 added a provision concerning
derivative liability to the act. See 17 U.S.C. § 905(3) (2005). That provision was "limited to the sui
generis protection added in 1984 for semiconductor mask works, and is inapplicable to
copyrightable works in general." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 12.04[A]. The DMCA also added
two significant provisions concerning derivative liability. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The first
immunizes from indirect liability several types of entities, including ISPs, telecommunications
companies, and Internet search engines, if they meet certain requirements. See 17 U.S.C. § 512
(2005). The second provides that a person may be held criminally liable for manufacturing,
importing, or providing to consumers a device designed "to descramble a scrambled work, to
decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid. . . a technological measure" used to protect
copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2005).
The Patent Act explicitly recognizes derivative liability. It provides that a person infringes a
patent if he "actively induces infringement of a patent" or meets the definition of a contributory
infringer. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b)-(c) (2005); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35, 440, 442 (1984) (noting the differences between the Patent Act and
Copyright Act).
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
35. Section 106 provides that a copyright owner has "the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following":
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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reproduce a copyrighted work.36 Accordingly, one who, without the
permission of the copyright owner, authorizes another to reproduce a
copyrighted work infringes the owner's reproduction right.3 7 The
legislative history to the 1976 Act further demonstrates that Congress
intended derivative liability to be incorporated into section 106.3 The
House Report on the 1976 Act states that "[u]se of the phrase 'to
authorize' is intended to avoid any question as to the liability of
contributory infringers."'3 9
In addition, an extensive line of cases under both the 1909 and 1976
Acts recognizes derivative liability.4 ° Arguably the most significant case
is Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios.4 ' In that case, Justice

Stevens stated, "[V]icarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of
law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of
the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to
'
hold one individual accountable for the actions of another."42
As demonstrated in Sony and other cases, the doctrines of derivative
liability have the potential to play an important role in copyright
enforcement. They enable plaintiffs to save costs by suing one or a few
indirect infringers instead of hundreds or thousands of direct infringers.43

copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159-60 (1976), reproducedin GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31,
at A: 149.
39. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 6:1; see H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 160, reproduced in
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at A: 149 (providing the following example: "[A] person who lawfully
acquires an authorized copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in the
business of renting it to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance" and further noting
that "[a] well-established principle of copyright law is that a person who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an infringer, including persons who can be considered
related or vicarious infringers); see also Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783
F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that phrase "to authorize" was "intended to
remove the confusion surrounding contributory and vicarious infringement").
40. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 12.04[A].
41. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
42. Id. at 435.
43. See Lichtman & Landes, supra note 27, at 398.
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They enable plaintiffs to obtain judgments in cases in which indirect
infringers possess greater financial resources than direct infringers."
Furthermore, they allow plaintiffs to obtain relief for the violation of their
rights even though the direct infringers are unknown or difficult to locate.45
Notwithstanding the common functions that the doctrines of derivative
liability serve, they are actually quite distinct.46 Vicarious liability and
contributory infringement share only one factor in common. Both theories
require the plaintiff to prove that one or more persons engaged in direct
infringement.47
A. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability has its origins in the tort law doctrine of respondeat
superior." It is not limited to that context, however. 49 A defendant may be
held vicariously liable for another person's direct infringement if the
defendant had the right and ability to supervise that person and a financial
interest in that person's infringement.5 "
1. Right and Ability to Supervise
Courts generally agree that a defendant possessed the right and ability
to supervise if the defendant had previously supervised the direct infringer
or had a contractual right to do so. For example, in Fonovisa, Inc. v.

44. See id. at 398-99; see also Michael B. Rutner, Note, The ASCAP Licensing Model and
the Internet: A Potential Solution to High-Tech Copyright Infringement, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1061,
1070 (1998) (noting that most persons who engage in online infringement "do not have enough
assets tomake legal action worthwhile").
45. For example, in Sony Corp. ofAmerica, the plaintiff did not know the identities of the
multitude of consumers who used VTRs to violate copyright law. See Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S.
at 422-23 (1984). This is also often the case in Internet copyright infringement. See Hamdani, supra
note 27, at 910 (noting that the "relative anonymity of Internet users makes detection of those who
violate copyright laws very costly").
46. In Sony Corp. ofAmerica, the Court asserted that the doctrines are easily confused. Sony
Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435, n.17. That seminal case and subsequent cases have helped to
elucidate the distinctions, though.
47. See NIMMER&NIMMER,supra note 33, § 12.04[A][3][a].
48. See HALPERN, supra note 32, at 551; see also Lauren Krohn, Causes ofAction Against
Employer to Recover UnderDoctrine of RespondeatSuperiorfor Intentional Torts Committedby
Employee, 17 CAUSES OF ACTION 647 § 2 (2004) (discussing the 18th century origins of the doctrine
of respondeat superior).
49. See HALPERN, supra note 32, at 551.
50. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304,307 (2d Cir. 1963). In contrast
to the theory of contributory infringement, the plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant
knew, or had a reason to know, of the person's infringing conduct. See infra Part II.C. The lack of
scienter may affect the remedies available, though. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33,
§ 12.04[CI[3].
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Cherry Auction, Inc.,5 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that a swap meet operator
had the right and ability to supervise the independent vendors to whom the
operator had rented booths.52 The court pointed out, that under the swap
meet contract, the operator had the right to ask the vendors to leave "for
any reason whatsoever."53 The court further noted that the operator
"controlled and patrolled" the vendors' booths,54 promoted the swap meet,
and regulated customer access to the facility.55 The court therefore asserted
that the operator's right and ability to supervise was both contractually
permissible and physically feasible.56
Courts have also found a right and ability to supervise in cases in which
it was far less practicable for the defendant to control the direct infringer.
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.," the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California found that the file-sharing service, Napster,
had the right and ability to supervise its users.58 Napster argued that it was
difficult, if not impossible, to determine what constituted legal or illegal
conduct on its service.59 The court pointed out, however, that Napster had
admitted to attempting to block infringing users.6 ° The court therefore held
Napster to the same standard as the swap meet operator even though it was
arguably far more difficult for Napster to police the direct infringers. 6'
2. Financial Interest
Legal authorities have at times disagreed on the type of financial
interest required to satisfy the second element of vicarious liability. Prior
to the enactment of the 1976 Act, Congress stated that a defendant must
"expect commercial gain.., and either direct or indirect benefit" from the
infringing activity. 62 However, in early cases, courts suggested that a
defendant must have "an obvious and direct financial interest" in the

51. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
52. Id. at 262-63, 264 (holding that the complaint stated a valid cause of action for vicarious
liability).
53. Id. at 262.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
58. Id. at 920-21.

59. Id.at 920.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 921.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 160 (1976), reproducedin GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at
A:149.
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infringement. 63 In one such case, Shapiro,Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green
Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the
defendant storeowner had a "direct financial interest" in its record
concessionaire's sale of bootleg records since the store received ten to
twelve percent of the sale of each recording.'
Over the years, courts have gradually relaxed the financial interest
requirement. In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged that the swap meet operator received a "direct financial
benefit."65 Yet, unlike the storeowner in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., the
swap meet operator did not receive a percentage of the vendors' sales of
the counterfeit recordings; it merely earned a modest daily fee from the
rental of the booths.6 6 The court stressed that the operator received
"substantial financial benefits" from the customers' admission fees,
concession sales, and parking fees. 67 These profits were generalized, and
not directly traceable to the infringement. 68 Nonetheless, the court
emphasized that all of these profits flowed from the draw of the counterfeit
recordings.69
The financial interest element has been further loosened to net
defendants that are not presently profiting from the infringement, but that
hold out hopes of monetary gain. In Napster, the district court found that
Napster possessed a financial interest in its users' infringement even
though the service was generating no revenue when the infringement
occurred.7" The court noted that Napster hoped to one day earn a profit as
a result of an increase in its user base. 71 The court pointed out that Napster
attracted users by offering free, infringing music.72 Despite the Napster
and Fonovisa courts' modest relaxation of the financial interest
requirement, the element remains a key factor in any vicarious liability
analysis.73

63. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
Courts in some more recent cases have characterized the financial interest requirement in this
manner. See Pinkham v.Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 834 (8th Cir. 1992); Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Starware Publ'g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 438, 441 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
64. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 308.
65. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
at 263-64.
69. See id.
70. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,921 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'din
part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 12.04[A][ 1].
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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B. Proving that a Parentis VicariouslyLiable
Under the aforementioned standard of vicarious liability, 74 a parent
could be held responsible for his child's file sharing if the plaintiff were
able to show that the parent possessed the right and ability to supervise the
child and a financial interest in the child's infringement.7" A plaintiff
would likely be able to demonstrate the former element, 76 but not the
latter.77 Thus, a parent would generally not be held vicariously liable for
his child's file sharing.78
1. Proving Right and Ability to Supervise
A plaintiff would have no difficulty establishing that a parent had the
right to supervise his child. Just as the swap meet operator in Fonovisahad
the right to make determinations about its vendors' products, 79 a custodial
parent has the right to make decisions regarding his child's education,
recreation, and discipline.8" A parent may forbid his child from engaging
in certain activities, such as bullying or stealing. In the same way, a parent
may prohibit his child from sharing music files and may punish him for
disobeying. To prove the right of supervision, a plaintiff would merely
have to establish the existence of the parent-child or guardian-child
relationship and demonstrate that the parent had previously supervised the
child. A plaintiff would not have to introduce a contract, as in Fonovisa,8"
since the parent-child relationship is founded on genetic ties or state
adoption proceedings, not on contract law.8"
A plaintiff would also be able to show that a parent had the ability to
supervise his child. File sharing often occurs in the parent's home, an area
over which the parent has dominion and control.8 3 There are numerous

74. See supra Part II.A.

75. See supra Part II.A.
76. See infra Part II.B. 1.
77. See infra Part II.B.2.
78. See infra Part II.B.3.
79. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).
80. In Piercev. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names oflesus andMary, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down a state statute requiring children to attend public schools. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925). The Court acknowledged the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control." Id.
81. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
82. SAMUEL GREEN & JOHN V. LONG, MARRIAGE & FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS § 5.40 (1984)
(noting that adoption is governed by state statutes); LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, FAMILY & STATE 108
(1988) (noting that "[c]hildren born during the course of a marriage are legally presumed to be the
legitimate offspring of the couple").
83. The concept that a "man's home is his castle" is well rooted in the common law. See
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the
the Fourth Amendment).
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steps a parent could take to control and supervise his child's Internet use
in the home. The parent could begin by having a discussion with his child,
in which the parent would explain the legal issues relating to file sharing
and forbid the child from engaging in the activity." The parent could then
install an Internet filter to block file-sharing networks,85 physically
supervise the child while online,8 6 install monitoring software to track the
child's Internet use,8 7 or periodically review the computer's folders for
suspicious files.88 If none of these actions proved successful, the parent
could temporarily revoke or limit the child's Internet or computer
privileges.
A clever child who was intent on trading files could certainly
circumvent these measures. A child could swap files while the parent was
occupied or at work, hide the files in an alternate hard drive, or even
override the filtering software.89 A court would be unlikely to absolve a
parent of liability for any of these reasons, however. Any difficulties a
parent might experience in monitoring a child's Internet use would pale in
comparison to Napster's problems in policing the activities of hundreds of
thousands of anonymous users on its service.9" Furthermore, any

84. See Patrick E. Corbett, Anatomy of a Computer Crime: Awareness of the ProblemMay
Provide a Remedy, 7 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 1,24-25 (2004) (encouraging parents
to discuss Internet copyright issues with their children); Harmon, supra note 15, at Al (reporting
that the RIAA's lawsuits have prompted parents to ask their children whether they share MP3 files);
Howland, supranote 17, at Opinion 9 (reporting a discussion in the author's household, in which
the author's husband asked the couple's daughters if they had ever downloaded music and then
forbade the activity). WiredSafety, an Internet safety group, has developed a helpful guide for
parents on how to talk to their children about file sharing. See Parry Aftab, Talking to Your
Children About Downloading Music-A Parent's Guide, http://www.wiredsafety.org/resources/
pdf/musicdownloadsparryguide.pdf (last visited May 17, 2005).
85. See Marcy Zitz,
Selecting Filtering Software for
Your Family,
http://familyintemet.about.com/cs/filteringsoftware/a/aafiltering-p.htm (last visited May 6,2005)
[hereinafter Zitz, Filtering Software]. For more information on Internet filters, see Janelle A.
Weber, Comment, The Spending Clause:Funding a Filth-FreeInternet or FilteringOut the First
Amendment?, 56 FLA. L. REv. 471, 478 n.70 (2004).
86. See Corbett, supra note 84, at 25 (stating that parents and guardians need to be "actively
involved" in monitoring their children's activities on the Internet).
87. See Marcy Zitz, Top 4 Monitoring Programs, http://familyintemet.about.com/cs/toppicks/
tp/monitoringsoft-p.htm (last visited May 6, 2005). Monitoring programs include eBlaster, Child
Safe, Parent Tools for AIM and Spector. See id
88. Some parents have contacted local computer stores for assistance in removing file-sharing
software from their hard drives. See generally Stock, supra note 30.
89. See Nik Bonopartis, Tech Advances Raise Internet Risks, POUGHKEEPSIE JOURNAL, Feb.
6, 2004, at IA (noting that children may learn how to bypass a filter from their friends); Zitz,
Filtering Software, supra note 85 (noting that a determined child may override the filtering
software or use a friend's computer that does not contain the software).
90. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,920 (N.D. Cal. 2000) aff'd
in
part,
rev"d in part on othergrounds, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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admission by the parent that he had monitored the child's other activities,
such as television viewing or homework, would support the contention that
supervision was feasible.9"
2. Proving Financial Interest
Demonstrating that a parent possessed a financial interest in his child's
file sharing would prove substantially more difficult than establishing the
right and ability to supervise. A plaintiff could argue that a child's file
sharing enabled a parent to save money on the child's entertainment
expenses. Consider the following example. Joel pays for his 13-year-old
daughter Megan's music until she receives a new computer for her
birthday and begins downloading music online. In one month, Megan
downloads one thousand songs for free in violation of copyright law. If
Joel had purchased those songs from a record-industry approved service
for $1 each, he would have paid $1,000. Alternatively, if Joel had
purchased those songs on $15 full-length CD's, and each CD contained
two of the songs on Megan's list, he would have paid $7,500. Since Joel
would rather use this money for other purposes, one might argue that he
has a financial interest in his daughter's infringement.
This argument is simplistic and legally flawed. Although the music
files had some financial value, Joel did not profit from Megan's
acquisition of the music. Megan listened to the music on her own and did
not share the files with her father. Moreover, although Joel might have
saved some money as a result of his daughter's file sharing, he did not earn
or hope to earn a profit from her infringement.92 Megan downloaded the
files for her own personal entertainment. She did not use them to produce
and market pirated CDs and then share the proceeds with her father. As an
aside, it is worth noting that Joel might not have saved that much money
from his daughter's file sharing. If Megan had not been able to download
the music, she would not have bought one thousand files or five hundred
CDs because Joel probably would have never permitted it. File-sharing
networks enable children to access music they would not have been able
to own otherwise. It is therefore highly unlikely that a plaintiff would be
able to prove the financial interest requirement.
3. Summary
Unless courts take the unlikely step of dramatically broadening the
scope of the financial interest element, a plaintiff generally would not be

91. See id. at 920-21.
92. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,263-64 (9th Cir. 1996); Napster,
114 F. Supp.
2dLaw
at 921.
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able to hold a parent vicariously liable for his child's file sharing. A parent
could possibly be held accountable for this infringement under the other
theory of derivative liability, though. The doctrine of contributory
infringement remains at the plaintiff's disposal.
C. ContributoryInfringement
Contributory infringement derives from the tort law concept of
enterprise liability.93 A defendant may be held liable as a contributory
infringer if the defendant had knowledge of another person's direct
infringement and materially contributed to that person's infringing
conduct.94 Each element presents unique challenges to a plaintiff.
1. Knowledge
A plaintiff may satisfy the first requirement of contributory
infringement by proving that the defendant knew or had a reason to know
of the direct infringer's conduct.95 These two degrees of knowledge are
known as active and constructive knowledge, respectively.96 Although
demonstrating constructive knowledge may prove easier in some cases, a
plaintiff may prefer to show actual knowledge since it suggests greater
culpability and may lead a court to award enhanced statutory damages. 97
In either case, a plaintiff will probably be required to show more than mere
"awareness of infringement"; a plaintiff will likely have to demonstrate
"some meaningful capacity to prevent or discourage infringement." 98
A plaintiff may show actual knowledge in a variety of ways. In
Fonovisa,the Ninth Circuit found that the swap meet operator could have
possessed actual knowledge that its vendors were selling counterfeit
recordings on the premises. 99 The court stated that the operator must have
known about the vendors' infringing activity, since prior to the plaintiff's
lawsuit, law enforcement authorities had seized thousands of counterfeit
recordings from the facility.1 00 Then, after the operator failed to rectify the

93. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 33, § 12.04[A] [2].
94. In Gershwin PublishingCorp. v. Columbia ArtistsManagement,Inc., the Second Circuit
articulated the prevailing test of contributory infringement. See 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
The court stated that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory'
infringer." Id.
95. See Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); Screen Gems-Columbia
Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
96. See Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc., 256 F. Supp. at 404.
97. See supra note 25 (discussing statutory damages).
98. See Lichtman & Landes, supra note 27, at 396-97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. See 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
100. Id. at 261.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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situation, authorities sent the operator a letter notifying the operator that
infringing materials were still being sold. l"' In another case, A&M
Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, °2 the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California found that a defendant who had supplied counterfeiters with
nonstandard-length cassettes and other materials possessed actual
knowledge that they were being used to create pirated recordings.0 3 The
court pointed out that on several occasions, the defendant had spoken with
the counterfeiters about their intended use of the cassettes." These two
decisions demonstrate that a defendant may be found to have actual
knowledge if the defendant has communicated with or received a relevant
communication from the direct infringer or legal authorities. 5
It is less clear what a plaintiff must demonstrate to prove constructive
knowledge.0 6 In Napster,the district court found that Napster possessed
constructive knowledge of its users' unauthorized file sharing.0 7 The court
noted that Napster's executives were sufficiently familiar with intellectual
property laws to sue a rock band that had used the company's logo.' 8 The
court also noted that the executives had downloaded files onto their own
computers using the technology and had promoted the service by
displaying infringing materials.0 9 The Napster court's reasoning suggests

101. Id.
102. 948 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
103. Id. at 1456. Counterfeiters desire specially-timed cassettes because they do not leave
large amounts of blank space at the end of each side. Id. at 1454.
104. Id.at 1454-55.
105. See Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. at 1454-56; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261, 264.
106. See Pink, supra note 27, at 622 ("[W]hile knowledge is clearly a requirement of
contributory copyright infringement, courts and commentators alike appear confused about the
level of knowledge that is sufficient to create liability.").
107. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,919 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'din
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court also found
that Napster possessed actual knowledge. Id. at 918. It noted that a document written by a Napster
executive mentioned "the need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses 'since they
are exchangingpiratedmusic"' and that the RIAA had informed Napster of thousands of infringing
files on its service, some of which were still available. Id. at 918. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
noted that it was "apparent from the record that Napster has knowledge, both actual and
constructive, of direct infringement." Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. In terms of actual knowledge, it
stated that Napster knew that infringing material was available on its system and that it could block
suppliers of infringing material from accessing the system. Id.at 1022.
108. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
109. Id.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that in light of Sony it would not impute
knowledge to Napster merely because the file-sharing technology could be used to infringe the
plaintiffs' copyrights. Napster,239 F.3d at 1020-21. It stated that the district court had "improperly
confined the use analysis to current uses, ignoring the system's capabilities." Id. at 1021. The court
nonetheless affirmed the preliminary injunctions with directions to the district court for
modification of their scope. Id. at 1027. The distinctions between the district court's and Ninth
knowledge
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that a defendant would be more likely to have constructive knowledge of
infringement perpetrated through file sharing if the defendant possessed
legal sophistication and personal experience with file-sharing networks." 0
2. Material Contribution
A plaintiff may fulfill the second requirement of contributory
infringement by establishing that the defendant "encourage[d] or
assist[ed]" the infringement of another."' The plaintiff may typically
prove this in one of three ways. The plaintiff may show that the defendant
provided the site and facilities, provided the machinery or materials, or
engaged in conduct that facilitated the infringement and failed to take steps
to prevent it.
a. Providing Site and Facilities
In Fonovisa,the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff adequately alleged
that the swap meet operator materially contributed to its vendors' sale of
counterfeit recordings by "actively striv[ing] to provide the environment
and the market" for known infringing activity. 112 The court noted that the
operator had provided the vendors with booth space, utilities, parking,
advertising, and customers." 3 Although the court acknowledged that the
operator may not have expressly promoted the sale of the pirated
recordings, it found these other factors sufficient to reverse the district
court, which had dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the pleadings." 4
b. Providing Machinery or Materials
In RCA Records, Inc. v. All-Fast Systems, Inc.,1"5 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York enjoined a retail copy service

case since a parent, unlike Napster, is not entitled to the Sony defense. See infra text accompanying
notes 115-24 (discussing RCA Records, Inc. v. All-Fast Sys., Inc.).
110. See Napster,239 F.3d at 1027.
111. See id. at 1019; see also WiLLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 1147 (1994).
112. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 264-65. In much the same way, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a videocassette retailer could have materially contributed to infringement by enabling the
unauthorized public performance of the plaintiffs films at the retailer's stores. See Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1986). In Columbia Pictures
Industries, the retailer allowed paying customers to use its viewing rooms to watch videos, which
the customers either selected from the defendant's library or brought with them. Id. The retailer's
employees did not operate the video cassette players but provided assistance to customers upon
request. Id. at 61. The court found that the retailer "knowingly promot[ed] and facilitat[ed]" the
infringement. Id. at 62 n.3. As a result, the court granted an injunction against the retailer. Id. at 64.
115. 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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from allowing its customers to use a tape-duplicating machine in its
store.116 The court contrasted the copy service's situation with that of
Sony, a manufacturer of videotape recorders (VTRs).ll 7 In Sony, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that Sony was not liable as a contributory infringer for
its customers' unauthorized reproduction of television programs because
the VTR was a "staple article of commerce ...

capable of substantial

'

noninfringing uses.
The district court reasoned that the copy service, unlike Sony, had
ample opportunity to control the use of the tape-duplicating machine by
refusing to sell counterfeit copies.119 The court noted that the copy service
was aware of each use of the machine and made "hundreds of commercial
decisions in exploiting" it. 2 ' The service therefore fit the traditional
description of a contributory infringer.121 The court noted that even if the
machine was capable of substantial noninfringing uses, it was not a 2Veat
burden on the copy service to avoid contributory infringement.' By
contrast, the burden on the manufacturer of the tape-duplicating machines
would be great since it could only stop the infringing use by terminating
the sale of the devices entirely.2 Since the copy service was not entitled
to the Sony defense,
the court determined that the plaintiffs were entitled
12
to an injunction. 1
c. Facilitating Infringement and Failing to Take Steps to Prevent It
In Casella v. Morris,125 the Eleventh Circuit held that, based on the
district court's fact findings, a restaurateur materially contributed to
116. See id.at 340.
117. Seeid.at339.
118. 464 U.S. 417, 442, 446 (1984). For a critique of Sony, see Lichtman & Landes, supra
note 27, at 400-01.
119. See RCA Records, 594 F. Supp. at 339.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
at 340-41. In ElektraRecords Co. v. Gem ElectronicDistributors,Inc., the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the defendants, a chain of record
stores, materially contributed to their customers' infringement of the plaintiffs' sound recordings
by stocking their stores with coin-operated "Make-a-tape" machines. 360 F. Supp. 821, 821-22
(E.D.N.Y. 1973). Customers used these devices to make copies of copyrighted cassette tapes from
the store's library for one-half or less of the price of the original recordings. Id. at 823. The
defendants' employees did not operate the machines but were alleged to have assisted customers
upon request. Id.at 822 n.3. The court found that irrespective of the role played by the defendants'
employees, the defendants materially contributed by enabling the customers to access the machines
and use them to illegally duplicate tapes. Id. at 823; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948
F. Supp. 1449, 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (granting an injunction against a defendant who supplied
audio equipment to the makers of counterfeit recordings).
125. 820 F.2d 362 (1lth Cir. 1987).
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another company's infringement when he purported to transfer the rights
to the plaintiffs copyrighted songs to that company. 26 The restaurateur
asked the plaintiff to write several songs for his establishments' star
attraction, a troupe of robotic singing bears. 27 A dispute arose after the
restaurateur failed to pay the plaintiff the total amount due for the licenses
on the songs. 28 The plaintiff sent the defendant a cease-and-desist letter,
informing him that further use of the songs would constitute
infringement. 129 One month after this notification, the restaurateur sold the
franchise rights to another company, nominally giving it the use of the
licensed songs. 3 ° As part of the deal, the restaurateur obtained a ten
percent interest in the company."' The court found that the restaurateur
facilitated the company's eventual infringement of the songs through the
purported transfer of the use rights. 3 2 The court additionally found that the
restaurateur failed to take any steps to stop the transfer of the rights or to
notify the purchasing company about the terminated licenses. 33
' The court
concluded that the restaurateur's "utter inaction"
was
enough to sustain a
34
finding that he had induced the infringement. 1
D. Proving ContributoryInfringement
Applying the aforementioned standard of contributory infringement,'
a parent could be held liable if the plaintiff was able to show that the
parent had knowledge of his child's file sharing and materially contributed37
to that conduct.136 A plaintiff could theoretically prove both38elements.
Each element would present significant challenges, though.1
1. Proving Knowledge
There are several ways in which a parent could acquire actual
knowledge of his child's unauthorized file sharing. A parent could witness
the child illegally download files. The child, or another person, such as a
sibling, friend, or relative, could inform the parent of the child's infringing
activity. File-sharing software on the computer's desktop could alert a
126. See id. at 365-66.
127. Id. at 363.
128. Id. at 363-64.
129. Id. at 364.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 365-66.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 366.
135. See supra Part II.C.
136. See supra Part I.C.
137. See infra Parts II.D.1-2.
138. See infra Parts II.D.1-2.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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parent to the child's copyright violations. Or, a parent, perturbed by his
computer's dwindling hard drive space, could discover infringing files in
the computer's folders.
While any of these scenarios might lead a parent to acquire actual
knowledge of his child's infringement, it is not at all certain that would be
the result. A parent who is unfamiliar with computers and the Internet may
witness his child download a music file but still may not comprehend what
the child has done. Even a parent who is familiar with downloading and
who knows that his child has acquired files online may not understand that
this practice is a potential violation of copyright law. Unlike the executives
in Napster,13 9 many parents are unfamiliar with intellectual property laws.
A parent who is somewhat aware of the illegality of unauthorized file
sharing may still be confused by legal technicalities and the advertising of
file-sharing networks. A 23-year-old mother in California was sued after
she allowed a teenage family friend to download music onto her computer
using Kazaa." 0The woman had read about the litigation involving Napster
and the subsequent temporary shutdown of the service.' She said she
"just assumed that if Napster was down, why would something be up that
was illegal?"'14 2 Or, recall the situation of the 12-year-old girl who was
sued by the RIAA. 14 3 The girl's mother said she had assumed it was legal
to use the Kazaa Plus service since it charged a fee.'" Moreover, at the
time this Note was written, the Kazaa home page stated twice that
"[h]aving Kazaa is 100% legal.' 45 Although the statement is literally true,
it is capable of misleading both children and parents. 146 "Having" Kazaa

139. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,919 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). For example, Darlene
Emanski said she was aware that her daughter had downloaded some music files but did not know
that it was a violation of copyright law. See telephone interview with Darlene Emanski, supra
note 1.
140. See Ahrens, supra note 12, at E 1.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Sangha & Furman, supra note 30, at Domestic News.
144. Id. "If you're paying for it, you're not stealing it, so what is this all about?" the mother
said. Id.
145. See Kazaa, Having Kzaa is 100% Legal, http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/new100percentlegal.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). On an internal page on the site, Kazaa notes that
"[u]se of the software to download or share copyrighted works without the permission of the
copyright owner may be illegal in many jurisdictions." Id. Kazaa states that a user must therefore
be certain that his use complies with the company's End User License Agreement. Kazaa, End User
License Agreement, http://www.kazaa.com/us/terms2.htm (last visited May 6, 2005). The
agreement states that a user must not "[t]ransmit, access or communicate any data that infringes any
patent, trademark, trade secret, or other proprietary rights of any party." Id.
146. A competitor of Kazaa, such as Napster or iTunes, could potentially bring an action
against the service under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2005). Under
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and "using" it to download files without the authorization of the copyright
owner is not a distinction many persons would readily grasp.
Nonetheless, the publicity surrounding these individuals' situations has
certainly made many parents aware that unauthorized file sharing often
constitutes copyright infringement. Even so, these parents may still not
know when their child has engaged in illegal conduct. This is because
there are several ways in which a person can legally download music files.
For instance, an Internet user can legally download a file if given
permission by the copyright owner. 14 7 Many artists and record companies
promote their music by posting files on Web sites and allowing fans to
download them for free. 148 Or, a person can legally download music
through paid services, such as iTunes Music Store' 49 and the new
Napster."5 ° Furthermore, one may download music if he has a fair use
" ' A child who downloads a song to gather information for a
defense.15
research paper on Internet copyright violations may have such a defense. 52
1

the act, a corporation can be liable to a competitor who believes he is damaged by a "false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . in
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities." 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2005).
147. The 1976 Copyright Act only prohibits the unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted
work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
148. For example, MTV offers free downloads on its Web site. See MTV Music,
http://www.mtv.com/music/. Independent artists also offer music on such sites as Sonic Awareness.
See Sonic Awareness, http://www.sonicawareness.com.
149. Apple's iTunes Music Store offers songs from independent artists and major labels for
$.99 per song. See Apple, iTunes Music Store, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/.
150. Napster allows users to download an unlimited amount of songs for $14.95 per month.
See Napster, http://www.napster.com.
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005). This section provides that the fair use of a copyrighted work
"for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." Id. In determining
whether a fair use exists, courts consider four factors. See id. These factors include:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
the nature of the copyrighted work;
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.

Id. No single factor is dispositive. See Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, TowardaFairUse Standard,
103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1110-11 (1990) (stating that the factors "direct courts to examine the issue
from every pertinent comer and to ask in each case whether, and how powerfully, a finding of fair
use would serve or disserve the objectives of the copyright").
152. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Napster: The Casefor the Need for a Missing Direct
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Given these legitimate means of downloading files, a parent who catches
a glimpse of a file-sharing network on the computer screen or who
discovers music files on the hard drive may legitimately believe the child
has downloaded the tunes legally.
A plaintiff would also have to overcome the challenge of finding
cooperative witnesses to testify about the parent's actual knowledge. In
Abdallah, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of the defendant's
presumably disgruntled employee. 53
' In a parental liability case though, the
persons who might have spoken with the parent about the child's file
sharing include the parent's spouse, the child himself, siblings, relatives,
and friends. These persons have a close bond with the parent and are likely
to view the parent's situation in a sympathetic light. They are therefore
unpredictable witnesses who cannot be relied upon to provide useful
evidence in a deposition or trial.
Similarly, a plaintiff would probably lack adequate documentary
evidence to prove actual knowledge. Unlike plaintiffs in other cases, the
RIAA has not sent cease-and-desist letters to individual file sharers and
subsequently monitored their conduct, presumably because of the
administrative and financial burden this would entail.' 54 While the
organization has sent scores of instant messages to persons informing them
that unauthorized file sharing is illegal, 55
' it is impossible to detect whether
a parent actually received one of those messages. Given all of these
obstacles in establishing actual knowledge, it is far more likely that a
plaintiff would seek to prove constructive knowledge.
There are numerous factors that might give a parent a reason to know
that his child has engaged in unauthorized file sharing. A parent may have
a reason to know if the parent heard the child listening to an assortment of
new music on his computer or discussing file sharing with his friends. A
newspaper article or television report on the prevalence of file sharing
among youths may lead a parent to suspect that his child has also engaged
in infringing conduct. A parent may even have a reason to know by virtue
of the fact that he owns the computer and subscribes to the ISP, or because
the infringement is occurring under his own roof. Furthermore, applying
the district court's reasoning in Napster, a parent might be more likely to
Infringer,9 ViLL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 57,78(2002). Gibbons states that a user's private distribution
of MP3 files to friends or acquaintances may constitute a fair use. Id. Another commentator has
argued that sampling, or downloading music to decide whether to purchase it, is also a fair use. See
Valerie Alter, Note, Building Rome in a Day: What Should We Expect from the RIAA?, 26
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 155, 164-65 (2003).

153. A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1454-55 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
154. See R1AA, "John Doe" Lawsuits, supra note 19 (noting that the RIAA must file "John
Doe" lawsuits, and then issue a subpoena to learn an infiringer's identity).
155. See Steve Seidenberg, New Battlegroundin File-Sharing:After CopyrightLoss, Strategy
Shifts to Going After Individuals,NAT'L L.J., May 5, 2003, at A15.
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possess constructive knowledge if he was knowledgeable about copyright
law and had previously downloaded songs.156 Yet, in contrast to the
executives in Napster,'57 a parent typically does not play such a critical
role in facilitating the file sharing, and therefore would probably have less
of a reason to know of the infringement.
In proving constructive knowledge, a plaintiff would still have to
surmount the hurdle of introducing probative testimonial or documentary
evidence. However, a plaintiff might not be required to prove that the
parent actually knew that the particular files in question were acquired in
an illegal manner. 5 ' Constructive knowledge therefore represents a
feasible means of satisfying the knowledge element in a parental liability
case.
2. Proving Material Contribution
After establishing the knowledge requirement, a plaintiff would need
to show that a parent facilitated his child's file sharing under one of the
three prevailing standards of material contribution.' 59 A plaintiff would
have strong arguments that a parent's conduct satisfied one or more of the
three standards. However, a parent would also have viable
counterarguments that his particular action, or inaction, was not analogous
to that of defendants found liable in prevailing cases.
a. Proving that a Parent Provides the Site and Facilities
A plaintiff could argue that a parent provides his child with the site and
facilities for unauthorized file sharing in much the same way as the swap
meet operator in Fonovisa.160 A parent provides his child with a room,
desk, lighting, Internet connection, food, and shelter. These amenities
make it both possible and convenient for a child to engage in file sharing.
A parent likely continues to provide these amenities after learning that a
child has illegally acquired songs.
Although a parent arguably supplies his child with the site and
facilities, it is unclear that the parent "actively strives" to facilitate the
infringement or create a market for the infringing materials in the same
156. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,919 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on othergrounds, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
157. See id.
158. See supratext accompanying notes 95-96 (noting that the constructive knowledge inquiry
focuses on whether a defendant had a reason to know of the infringement).
159. See supra Part II.C.2.
160. See generally Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the swap meet operator materially
contributed to its vendors' sale of counterfeit recordings by providing the vendors with booth space,
utilities, parking, advertising, and customers).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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manner as the swap meet operator.' 6 ' Unlike the operator,'62 a parent's
motivation for providing his child with site and facilities is not to promote
the child's file sharing. Instead, a parent provides his child with these
amenities to enable him to complete his homework, surf the Internet, and
communicate with friends. A parent is driven by his desire to fulfill his
parental duties, not to line his pockets. Also, a parent does not actively or
purposely put other file sharers in contact with his child. The parent
passively brings the file sharers within the child's reach by furnishing the
Internet connection.
Another important distinction concerns the nature of the parent-child
relationship. In contrast to the swap meet operator-vendor relationship, a
parent cannot terminate the parent-child relationship or expel the child
from the home after discovering the infringing files. A parent may also be
loath to fully revoke the child's Internet privileges, given the vast amount
of worthwhile, educational material available online and the nature of the
child's homework assignments. Thus, a parent may be able to defend
successfully against a plaintiffs assertion that he provided the sites and
facilities.
b. Proving that a Parent Provides the Machinery or Materials
Additionally, a plaintiff could assert that a parent, similar to the copy
service in RCA Records, supplied his child with the machinery and
materials that made the file sharing possible.'63 A parent furnishes his child
with a computer, the primary tool he needs to engage in file sharing. In
some cases, a parent also provides his child with blank CDs or an MP3
player, which enable the child to copy the files and to listen to them in
other locations.
A parent is not absolved of liability merely because the computer or
CDs are capable of substantial noninfringing uses, such as word
processing or recording one's own works. As the court in RCA Records
made clear, the Sony defense is available to the manufacturers of staple
articles of commerce, not to consumers who have the ability to control the
use of these products." 64 Thus, computer manufacturer Hewlett-Packard
(HP) could assert the defense if it was sued as a result of an Internet user's
illegal file sharing.165 Yet a parent who purchased the computer would not

161. See id. at 264.
162. See id.
163. See generally RCA Records, v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(enjoining a retail copy service from allowing customers to use a tape-duplicating machine in its
store because the machine enabled the customers to engage in direct infringement).
164. Id. at 339.
165. See id.
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be entitled to the defense.' 66 Unlike HP, a parent has ample opportunity to
control his child's computer use and to prevent infringing uses. It would
therefore not substantially burden a parent to avoid contributory
infringement. By contrast, HP undoubtedly would be harmed by having to
prevent children's file sharing. HP could only do this by terminating the
sale of its computers
entirely or by eliminating the devices' ability to log
167
on to the Internet.
A parent is not necessarily as culpable as the copy service in RCA
Records, however. Unlike this defendant, a parent does not charge the
child a fee, and thus does not make a commercial decision every time the
child uses the computer or goes online. 168 And unlike the copy service, a
parent is probably not certain that each time his child browses the Internet,
the parent is facilitating the child's infringement. 69 For these reasons, a
parent may be able to distinguish RCA Records and similar cases.
c. Proving that a Parent Facilitates Infringement and Fails to
Take Steps to Prevent It
Finally, a plaintiff could argue that a parent acted like the defendant in
Casellaby facilitating his child's infringement and failing to take steps to
prevent it. 7° A parent enables a child to engage in infringement when the
parent subscribes to an ISP and gives the child permission to connect to
the Internet without supervision. In cases in which the parent installs filesharing software on the household computer or subscribes to a file-sharing
service, such as Kazaa Plus, the plaintiffs argument would be even
stronger. Moreover, under the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning, a parent may
also facilitate a child's infringement when he fails to take steps to prevent
the conduct,' 7 ' such as placing restrictions on the child's Internet use or
installing a filter. Thus, the parent may "induce" the child's infringement
through his "utter inaction."'72
It is unclear though, whether a court would find that a parent's action
facilitated the infringement to the same degree as the restaurateur's
conduct in Casella.'73 A parent's subscription to an ISP is not as closely

166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Seeid.
170. See generally Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
restaurateur materially contributed to another company's infringement when he purported to
transfer the rights to the plaintiff's copyrighted songs to that company and failed to take any steps
to prevent the likely infringement).
171. See id. at 365-66.
172. See id.
173. See id.
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related to the direct infringement as the defendant's purported sale of the
plaintiff's song rights.' 74 The restaurateur attempted to sell the song rights
1 Furthermore, it was nearly
to profit from the purchaser's infringement. 75
inevitable that the purchaser would infringe the plaintiff's rights after the
deal was completed.' 76 By contrast, a parent primarily subscribes to an ISP
to engage in activities that have no relation to infringement, such as
reading the news, shopping, or paying bills. Although it may be
foreseeable, it is not inevitable that a child will engage in file sharing upon
the parent's subscription to the ISP. These counterarguments may not be
available to all parents, however. A parent who subscribed to a file-sharing
service on behalf of his child would more closely resemble the restaurateur
act and the child's infringement
since the connection between the parent's
77
would be more naturally linked.
3. Summary
Given the current state of the law, it is possible, but not certain, that a
plaintiff could satisfy the material contribution element in a parental
liability case. Although on its face a parent's action or inaction seems to
fulfill each of the three standards, a parent may be able to distinguish the
cases in which those standards were articulated. Consequently, it is an
open question whether a plaintiff would be able to hold a parent liable for
his child's file sharing under the doctrine of contributory infringement. It
would therefore be useful to consider whether the imposition of parental
liability in the file-sharing context would comport with the manner in
which parental liability has been applied in a related area of law: torts.
111. PARENTS' LIABILITY UNDER COMMON LAW TORT PRINCIPLES

Tort law is particularly relevant to the consideration ofparental liability
in copyright law. As noted previously, contributory infringement arose out
of tort law.' 78 Furthermore, tort law, unlike copyright law, comprises a
well-developed body of common law rules dealing with a parent's liability
for his child's intentional wrongs.' 79 State legislatures largely abandoned
174. Seeid.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See Sangha & Furman, supra note 30, at Domestic News (reporting that the mother of
a 12-year-old girl that was sued for copyright infringement had subscribed to Kazaa Plus on her
daughter's behalf).
178. See NIMMER & NIMER, supra note 33, § 12.04[A][2].
179. See Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Parents'Liabilityfor Injury or DamageIntentionally
Inflicted by Minor Child,54 A.L.R. 3D 974 (2004) (collecting cases in which plaintiffs sued parents
on the basis of their children's intentional torts or the parents' own negligent supervision of their
children).by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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these rules in the 1950s and 1960s in favor of a strict liability standard
with relatively low caps on damages. 8° Notwithstanding this shift in the
law,'81 the common law rules, and the reasoning underlying them, provide
useful guidance in the area of copyrights.
A. Negligent Entrustment of DangerousInstruments
The first tort that is pertinent to this analysis involves dangerous
instruments. At common law, a parent could be found negligent if he
entrusted his child with or gave him access to a dangerous tool, such as a

180. See Linda A. Chapin, Out of Control? The Uses andAbuses of ParentalLiabilityLaws
to Control Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 621, 631-32
(1997); Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of their Children:ParentalResponsibilityfor Juvenile
Delinquency,5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 303,310 (1991); L. Wayne Scott, Liability
ofParentsfor Conductof Their Child UnderSection 33.01 of the Texas Family Code: Defining the
Requisite Standardsof "Culpability,"20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 69, 87-91 (1988). Legislatures in nearly
every state passed these laws in an effort to curb juvenile delinquency and ensure that victims
received some compensation for their injuries. Id. at app. (noting that as of 1987, 49 states had
parental tort liability statutes); Note, VicariousParentalLiability in Connecticut:Is it Effective?,
7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 99, 121-24 (1986) (citing states' parental liability statutes). These laws
generally hold parents strictly liable for their children's "willful," "malicious," or "intentional" acts,
allowing plaintiffs to recover damages for personal injury and in many cases, property damage. See
Chapin, supra, at 632. The stringency of these laws is partly mitigated by their relatively low caps
on damages. Scott's comprehensive, although now dated, study found the limits on recovery ranged
from $250 to $15,000. See Scott, supra, at app.
181. Notwithstanding the low caps on damages, a few commentators have criticized civil and
criminal parental civil liability statutes as ineffective and unduly harsh. See Chapin, supranote 180,
at 672 (asserting these laws are a limited and "not ... particularly effective" solution to a complex
problem); Geis & Binder, supra note 180, at 321 (arguing that the statutes are misguided because
they punish parents even though they are generally incapable of preventing their children's
delinquent actions and are often doing the best they can); Comment, "ParentalResponsibility"
Ordinances-IsCriminalizingParentsWhen ChildrenCommit UnlawfulActs a Solution to Juvenile
Delinquency, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1551, 1577 (1973) (arguing that "juvenile delinquency is a
complex problem... [that] cannot be solved by a single, narrow approach" and that criminal
parental responsibility ordinances seem to place a great burden on parents). Some commentators
assert that other steps may be better suited toward decreasing delinquency. See Deborah A.
Nicholas, Note, Parental Liability for Youth Violence: The Contrast Between Moral
Responsibilitiesand Legal Obligations,53 RUTGERS L. REV. 215,242 (2000) (stating that one of
the most effective ways of decreasing youth violence is "to create healthy circumstances under
which families can grow and develop"). Nonetheless, a few commentators have defended parental
liability acts as a legitimate civil remedy for victims. See Dana E. Prescott & Cynthia L. Kundin,
TowardaModelParentalLiability Act, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 187,209-17 (1984) (proposing a model
parental liability act and urging states to remove caps on damages); Andrew C. Gratz, Comment,
Increasingthe Priceof Parenthood:When Should ParentsBe Held Civilly Liablefor the Torts of
Their Children?, 39 Hous. L. REV. 169, 199 (2002) (recommending that the Texas Legislature
adopt section 316 of the Restatement, thereby permitting victims of child tortfeasors to recover
damages for their injuries and encouraging parents to control their children).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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' A parent could also be found negligent if he supplied his child with
gun. "82
an object that was potentially dangerous because of the child's immaturity
or tendency to mishandle it, such as matches or a vehicle.' 83 The dangerous
instrumentality doctrine is based on the notion that it is foreseeable that
providing a child with access to hazardous objects would result in harm to
another. 84
Although a computer is not typically thought of as a tool that can harm
another person's body or property, it nonetheless shares some of the
characteristics of a potentially dangerous instrument.' 85 When a computer
is placed in the hands of a pre-teen or teenage music lover, who has a
demonstrated tendency to disrespect copyright law, it is foreseeable that
it will be used to infringe a copyright owner's exclusive rights in his sound
recordings. 86 A computer that is connected to the Internet can be as
potentially hazardous to a copyright owner's intellectual property rights as
a BB gun is to a neighbor's windows. It would therefore seem consistent
with the dangerous instrument doctrine to hold a parent accountable for
knows the child has a
entrusting a child with a computer if the parent
187
sharing.
file
unauthorized
practice
proclivity to
B. Negligent ParentalSupervision
The second tort that is of interest to this analysis relates to a parent's
supervision of his child. At common law, a parent could be held liable if
he knew that his child had a tendency to engage in a particular intentional
tort and notwithstanding, negligently failed to take reasonable steps to
control him. 8 8 In applying this tort, courts sought to balance the interests
of individual families and society at large.
182. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 28, § 123.

183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
187. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 28, § 123.
188. Id.; see generally Habeeb, supra note 179 (collecting cases in which plaintiffs sued
parents on the basis of their children's intentional torts or the parents' own negligent supervision
of their children). The Restatement Second of Torts has articulated this tort in the following
manner:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child
as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as
to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such
control.
RESTATEMENT
OF TORTSRepository,
§ 316 (1965).2005
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For example, in Bieker v. Owens, 189 the Arkansas Supreme Court
considered whether a mother and father were accountable for their sons'
alleged beating of another boy. 9 ° The court stated that it would be
unreasonable to hold a parent absolutely responsible for the actions of his
child "[s]ince each human mind and personality is exclusively that of the
individual possessing it."' 9' However, in this particular case, the parents
repeatedly failed to take measures to stop their sons' violent behavior, and
thereby "sanction[ed], ratiflied], and consent[ed] to the wrongful acts."' 92
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Harris stated that the majority's
decision would make parents aware of their responsibilities. 93 He
admonished parents who knew of their children's delinquent nature but
who were unwilling to take action to minimize the detrimental effects.'94

In neglecting their parental duties, these parents placed the burden upon
society at large. 195

Today, a child's ability to harm another is not limited to the child's
exertion of physical force against that person or his property. With the
touch of a button, a child can infringe the rights of thousands of copyright
owners. It would therefore seem consistent with the tort of negligent
parental supervision to enable a record industry plaintiff to recover against
a parent in the same way as the plaintiff in Bieker 9 6 A parent who knows
of his child's tendency to engage in file sharing, who supplies the child
with a computer and Internet connection, and who consistently fails to take
reasonable steps to prevent the infringement "sanction[s], ratiflies], and
consent[s] to the wrongful acts."' 9 7 Like the parents in Bieker, the knowing
parent of a file sharer could take a number of measures, such as forbidding
the child from engaging in the conduct or installing an Internet filter, to
reduce the probability or scope of the child's infringement.' 98 By failing
to take these steps, the parent abdicates his parental responsibilities and

189. 350 S.W.2d 522 (Ark. 1961).
190. Id. at 523.
191. Id. at 524; see also Norton v. Payne, 281 P. 991, 992 (1929) (stating that a parent should
not be held to the same degree of liability as that of a person who owns a wild animal or vicious
dog).
192. Bieker, 350 S.W.2d at 526.
193. Id. (Harris, C.J., concurring).
194. Id. (Harris, C.J., concurring); see also Stone, supranote 28, at 35 (arguing that imposing
liability where parents have neglected their parental duties and such neglect is clearly related to the
child's torts may impress upon parents "their obligations to themselves, the child, and the society
in which they live").
195. Bieker, 350 S.W.2d at 526 (Harris, C.J., concurring).
196. See id. at 525-26.
197. Id at 526.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88 (discussing the measures a parent could take
to prevent his child from engaging in file sharing).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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thrusts a significant burden on the plaintiff ' In so doing, the parent
externalizes the copyright harm, forcing the plaintiff to resort to litigation
to protect its interests.2 °0
C. General Considerations
Although unauthorized file sharing differs substantially from the types
of intentional torts that children have traditionally committed, 21 it is still
reasonable to hold a parent accountable for this behavior. Unlike battery
or property damage, which generally occur on neighborhood streets,
unauthorized file sharing often occurs in the home. Because the home is
a zone where the parent has complete authority20 2 and substantial ability
to exercise control over his child, it is natural to expect a parent to assume
responsibility when the child's misdeeds occur there. Moreover, a parent
has the ability to substantially deter copyright infringement in the home
without expending significant cost or effort.20 3
The fact that file sharing may be more difficult to detect than other
intentional torts does not mean that parents should not be held accountable
for this conduct. The knowledge requirement of contributory infringement
protects parents who did not know or have a reason to know of their
child's infringement. °4 Courts have discretion to apply this element
strictly so that parents who are unfamiliar with copyright law and who had
no reason to suspect the infringing activity are not held liable. 20 5 It is
therefore apparent from this analysis of common law tort principles that
the imposition of parental liability in the copyright area would comport
with legal precedent.

199. See Bieker, 350 S.W.2d at 526 (Harris, C.J., concurring).
200. See supra text accompanying note 13 (noting the RIAA's lawsuits against individuals
accused of unauthorized file sharing).
201. See Habeeb, supra note 179 (listing the shooting of BB guns and scaring of farm animals
as common juvenile intentional torts).
202. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 100 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing
the historical origins of the notion that a "man's home is his castle" in the context of the Fourth
Amendment).
203. See Hamdani,supranote 27, at 911 (noting that indirect liability should only be extended
to those parties that can deter misconduct at a relatively low cost).
204. See supra Part II.C. 1 (discussing the knowledge requirement).
205. See Pink, supranote 27, at 622 (noting that courts are often confused about the degree
of knowledge required for liability). The confusion likely arises from courts' exercise of discretion
with regard
knowledge
requirement.
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IV. POLICY REASONS SUPPORTING PARENTS' LIABILITY FOR THEIR
CHILDREN'S FILE SHARING

Not only is parental liability in copyright law consistent with common
law tort rules, it is also supported by policy considerations. A parent who
knows that he could be held liable for his child's file sharing would be
more likely to supervise his child's Internet use in an attempt to prevent
the infringement.2" 6 Parental liability should therefore help reduce illegal
file sharing, thereby providing an incentive for authors and copyright
owners to continue to engage in productive efforts.20 7
Parental supervision would not only help reduce the child's
unauthorized file sharing, but it would also help protect the child from
accessing other harmful material on the Internet, such as pornography and
violent content.2 0 8 A parent who monitors his child's online activities
would become attuned to these risks and would be more likely to discuss
Internet-related issues with his child. If the lines of communication were
opened, parents and children would be able to respond to Internet hazards
together.
Furthermore, the imposition of parental liability may help foster a
culture of respect for intellectual property law in the home. Many parents
who presently turn a blind eye to their child's unauthorized trading of
thousands of files would be enraged if they discovered that their child had
shoplifted a single CD from a retail store.20 9 The threat of a lawsuit may

206. There is some indication that the RIAA's lawsuits have had an effect on the behavior of
adult file sharers. See Pew Internet Project and comScore Media Metrix Data Memo,
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPFilesharingApril_04.pdf. In a February-March 2004
telephone survey of 1,371 adult Internet users, 38% of respondents said they downloaded or shared
files less often in the preceding months because of the RIAA's lawsuits; 60% said they did not
change their habits. Id. at 1, 11. By contrast, in the November-December 2003 survey, 27% said
they downloaded or shared less often because of the suits, while 71% said their habits remained the
same. Id. at 11. The survey indicated that the retreat in file sharing was most noticeable among
online men between the ages of 18 to 29 and those who have broadband connections at home. Id.
at 1. Among Internet users who had never shared files online, 60% of respondents in the FebruaryMarch 2004 survey said the RIAA lawsuits would keep them from engaging in the practice in the
future. Id. at 2. Among this group, women with Internet access were more likely than men to
respond that they were dissuaded by the lawsuits. Id.
207. U.S. copyright law is founded on the notion that authors should be given an economic
incentive to produce works of authorship through the grant of a limited monopoly. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to legislative copyright and patent statutes "[t]o promote the
Progess of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
208. See Bonopartis, supra note 89, at lA (reporting that "pornography, pedophiles and cyber
stalkers, scams, spam e-mail hawking pornography and sex products, [and] gambling" present
concerns for parents).
209. See Aftab, supranote 84, at 6.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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encourage these parents to reconsider their contradictory views.2 1 ° At the
very least, it may lead parents to teach their children the importance of
adhering
to the law, even though the parent may personally disagree with
11
2

it.

V. TAILORING CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT TO THE IMPOSITION OF
PARENTAL LIABILITY FOR FILE SHARING

Although the imposition of parental liability in the file-sharing context
is supported by policy reasons, it would not be "just" unless the doctrine
of contributory infringement is appropriately tailored to parents' unique
circumstances. 212 The following suggestions would help to mitigate the
hardship parents might experience in being exposed to contributory
infringement liability.
A. MaterialContribution
To prove the material contribution element against a parent, a plaintiff
should be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
parent facilitated the child's file sharing and failed to take reasonable
steps to prevent it. This approach would be similar to that of the Eleventh
Circuit in Casella.13 This approach is necessary because, under a strict
interpretation of the RCA Records214 and Fonovisa l5 standards, a plaintiff
might only have to prove that the parent knowingly provided the computer
and blank CDs, or Internet connection, room, and utilities. 216 It is possible
that a parent who regularly supervised his child's Internet use and
periodically browsed the computer's files could still be held liable if the
child engaged in the infringement while the parent was at work or asleep
or if he otherwise hid his conduct. Imposing liability when the parent is
210. The Pew Internet Project-comScore Media Metrix survey indicates that an increasing
number of individuals who currently download music files are concerned about copyright. See Pew
Internet Project and comScore Media Metrix, supra note 206, at 11. In the February-March 2004
survey, 37% of respondents said they cared about whether the music they download was
copyrighted, whereas 58% said they did not care. Id. In the April-May 2003 survey, 26% of
respondents said they cared about copyright, whereas 70% said they did not. Id.
211. See Aftab, supra note 84, at 6 (noting that "[children] need to know that, in most cases,
downloading and sharing music online are no different from that shoplifting example" and
"[s]tealing is stealing").
212. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (stating that
contributory infringement is "merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the
circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another").
213. See supra Part II.C.2.c (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's approach in Casella).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 115-24 (discussing the approach of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York in RCA Records).
215. See supraPart II.C.2.a (discussing the Ninth Circuit's approach in Fonovisa).
216. by
SeeUF
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doing his utmost to prevent infringement would be unduly harsh. It would
be tantamount to holding a parent strictly liable for his child's intentional
torts-as under state parental liability acts-a practice that has been
widely criticized by commentators.217
By requiring the plaintiff to prove that a parent failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent the infringement, the doctrine of contributory
infringement would more closely approximate the common law tort of
negligent parental supervision.218 This approach would allow a fact finder
to engage in a modified negligence analysis to determine whether the
parent's actions or inaction were reasonable in light of the family's
personal circumstances and the parent's knowledge of copyright law and
the child's file-sharing tendency. It would give a fact finder the leeway to
determine in a particular case that a parent who was unable to prevent his
2 19
child's infringement nonetheless made reasonable attempts to do SO.
This approach would promote economic efficiency because parents would
not be required to engage in excessive measures to monitor their children's
Internet use. 22' A parent would be only held liable in cases in which the
his parental responsibilities, externalizing the copyright
parent abdicated
1
harm.

22

B. Damages
Additionally, to make contributory infringement a just standard of
liability for parents, it is necessary to consider the amount of damages
available in a file-sharing action. As the law currently stands, a parent
could be subject to extraordinary statutory damages under Section 504(c)
of the Copyright Act.222 If a child engaged in one thousand counts of
infringement, and the court awarded the plaintiff the minimum statutory
damages, $750 per count, the parent would be liable for $750,000.223 This
degree of exposure does not fit a parent's offense. Although a parent might
217. See supranote 181 (discussing scholars' views on the harshness of parental liability acts).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 188-95; see also Lichtman & Landes, supra note 27,
at 405-06 (discussing the application of a negligence rule to indirect liability).
219. See Bieker v. Owens, 350 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Ark. 1961) (stating that "each human mind
and personality is exclusively that of the individual possessing it").
220. See Lichtman & Landes, supranote 27, at 405 (noting that negligence rules "hold a party
liable in cases where that party's failure to take economically reasonable precautions results in a
harm"). Lichtman and Landes note that a negligence approach would "not [be] radically different
from current law." Id. They acknowledge that current law concentrates on the factors previously
discussed in this Note, including knowledge, right and ability to control, and other factors, without
giving a clear indication of why those issues are important. Id. They state that a negligence rule
would "lay bare the underlying logic of the indirect liability inquiry." Id.
221. See Bieker, 350 S.W.2d at 526 (Harris, C.J., concurring).
222. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2005).
223. See id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/5
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knowingly facilitate his child's infringement, the parent has no financial
interest in the conduct.224 Furthermore, aggregated statutory damages
could have disastrous financial consequences for a family, leading to
bankruptcy or a depletion of the child's college fund.
A plaintiff's damages against a parent should therefore be substantially
restricted in the file-sharing context.225 One possible solution would be to
amend the 1976 Copyright Act to include a reasonable cap on damages for
parents who are sued for their children's file sharing. This cap would apply
no matter how many files the child copied. The cap could be consistent
with the damage limits contained in state tort parental liability acts, which
generally do not exceed $1 5,000.226 These acts prevent many plaintiffs
from obtaining full compensation for their injuries, but they appropriately
balance the interests of parents and plaintiffs.227 A cap on copyright
damages might prevent a record industry plaintiff from being made whole;
however, it would recognize that a parent is fundamentally different from
a person or business that is in the business of piracy.228 A parent who
provides his child with a computer and Internet connection is primarily
motivated by his desire to help his child learn about technology and the
world beyond his community, not a desire to make a quick profit. 229 Thus,
through a reduction in the damages available and slight modification of the
material contribution standard, contributory infringement could serve as
a just standard of liability for a parent accused of facilitating his child's
unauthorized file sharing.

224. See supra Part I.B.2 (analyzing whether a parent has a financial interest in his child's
infringement).
225. See J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penaltiesin the Battle Against Illegal FileSharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages For Copyright
Infringement, 83 TEx. L. REv. 525,558-59 (2004) (urging Congress to amend the Copyright Act's
statutory damages provision in the file-sharing context because it imposes an "unconstitutional"
and "grossly excessive" penalty).
226. See supra note 180 (discussing caps on state parental liability acts).
227. But see Prescott & Kundin, supra note 181, at 213 (urging state legislatures to remove
caps on damages because "many victims are left with the bulk of their medical and repair
expenses").
228. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the ways in which parents are different from the
defendants that have been found liable in prevailing contributory infringement cases).
229. Another solution would be to shift to a specialized dispute resolution system, similar to
the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for Internet domain name trademark disputes. See Mark A.
Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting
Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1345, 1410-25 (2004). A team of expert panelists would review the
plaintiffs' claims in a faster, more efficient manner, thereby allowing for the awarding of lesser
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VI. CONCLUSION

This Note suggested that a plaintiff might be able to hold a parent liable
for his child's unauthorized file sharing under the doctrine of contributory
infringement. However, it also noted that a parent might be able to
distinguish prevailing cases applying the doctrine. This question likely will
not be answered in court in the near future. For the moment, it is in the
best interests of both the RIAA and parents to settle their disputes out of
court.23 ° This Note's consideration of a parent's potential liability has
practical significance in the realm of litigation, though. It demonstrated
that the RIAA has a good faith argument based on existing law or a
nonfrivolous argument for the modification of existing law that a parent
is liable for his child's file sharing.231 Thus, the RIAA would generally be
able to meet the requirements of Rule 11 if it were to sue a parent on the
basis of contributory infringement.3
Because of the parties' current tendency to settle, the recommendations
this Note offers for molding contributory infringement into a just theory
of parental liability are not in dire need of implementation. The RIAA has
not treated parents in an unjust fashion. Congress and the courts therefore
do not need to undertake measures to protect parents from copyright
infringement lawsuits at this time. This Note's recommendations would
prove useful if the RIAA changed its approach and began demanding
significantly higher settlement amounts or began taking cases to trial in an
effort to call greater attention to the problem of unauthorized file sharing.
The RIAA's lawsuits against parents, although stressful for those
particular families, may ultimately have positive consequences for society.
Certainly, parenting a pre-teen or teenage child is no simple task. A parent
must see to it that his child does not drink, smoke, fight, neglect his
schoolwork, or associate with the wrong crowd. Ensuring that a child does
not engage in unauthorized file sharing is one more obligation that some
parents may, understandably, be reluctant to assume. Nonetheless, the
230. By settling cases, the RIAA mitigates the effect of its seemingly harsh policy of suing
individuals, thereby forestalling an even greater public backlash against the record industry.
Parents, on the other hand, avoid the expense of hiring an attorney and the risk of losing their case.
231. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The rule provides that in presenting a pleading or other document
to the court an attorney or unrepresented party certifies:
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances .... the claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b).

232. See id.
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RIAA's lawsuits have called attention to the fact that in the digital age,
parents have no choice but to accept Internet supervision as an important
parental responsibility. Through a few clicks of a mouse, a child can
infringe thousands of copyrights, fall prey to an Internet predator, or
develop a gambling addiction. A parent should undertake reasonable
efforts to protect his child from these threats. A parent should gladly
accept his duty to supervise his child's Internet use and not foist this
burden upon society at large.
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